The fourth installment of a series on the history of Israel and Palestine. This part covers the war that lasted less than a week and whose consequences have lasted more than half a century, the war that gave Israel the territories it still holds, put more than a million Palestinians under military occupation, and created the settlement movement and the “land for peace” formula that dominate the conflict to this day.

Where we left off

By June 1967, a chain of miscalculations had brought Israel and its neighbors to the brink. Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser, responding to false Soviet reports of an Israeli buildup against Syria, had expelled the UN peacekeepers from the Sinai, massed his army on Israel’s border, closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, and signed a defense pact bringing Jordan under his command. Arab broadcasts spoke openly of destroying Israel. After weeks of unbearable tension, and with the Holocaust two decades behind it, Israel resolved to strike first. On the morning of June 5, 1967, it did.

Six days

The war was over almost before the Arab armies knew it had begun.

At 7:45 on the morning of June 5, the Israeli Air Force launched Operation Focus, a meticulously rehearsed surprise strike. Flying low to slip under radar, Israeli jets caught the Egyptian air force on the ground and destroyed it: hundreds of aircraft obliterated in their parking bays within a few hours. When Syria and Jordan entered the war later that day, their air forces met the same fate. In a single morning, Israel had won total command of the skies, and with it, effectively, the war. What followed on the ground was rapid and decisive.

There were three fronts:

  • Against Egypt, in the south, Israeli armored columns drove across the Sinai Peninsula to the Suez Canal in a matter of days, shattering the Egyptian army and seizing the Gaza Strip along the way.
  • Against Jordan, in the center, the fighting was not originally planned. Israel had sent word to Jordan’s King Hussein urging him to stay out of the war. But Hussein, bound by his pact with Nasser and misled by Egyptian claims of victory, ordered his forces to shell Israeli-held West Jerusalem. Israel responded by seizing the entire West Bank and East Jerusalem, including the walled Old City.
  • Against Syria, in the north, in the war’s final days Israel stormed and captured the Golan Heights, the strategic plateau from which Syrian guns had long overlooked Israeli farms below.

By the time a UN ceasefire took hold on June 10, six days after it began, the war was over. Israel had defeated three Arab armies and seized territory several times its own size. It was one of the most lopsided military victories of the twentieth century, and it changed the psychology of the entire region. For Israelis, the euphoria was immense: a nation that three weeks earlier had feared annihilation now stood triumphant and vastly enlarged. For Arabs, the defeat (remembered as al-Naksa, “the setback”) was a shattering humiliation that discredited Nasser’s Pan-Arabism and the promise that the Arab states would liberate Palestine.

The map, redrawn

At the end of the six days, Israel controlled:

  • The Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip, taken from Egypt.
  • The West Bank and East Jerusalem, taken from Jordan.
  • The Golan Heights, taken from Syria.

This is the map that has defined the conflict ever since. When people today speak of the “occupied territories” or the “1967 borders,” these are the lands they mean. Israel would eventually return the Sinai to Egypt (in 1982, as we’ll see) and withdraw its forces and settlers from inside Gaza (in 2005). But the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights remain under Israeli control to this day, and it is on the West Bank and East Jerusalem, the heart of any future Palestinian state, that the conflict now most bitterly turns.

The human consequence was immediate and enormous. Roughly one million Palestinians (the residents of the West Bank and Gaza) suddenly came under Israeli military occupation. A further 300,000 or so Palestinians fled or were displaced during the war, most across the river into Jordan; for many, this was the second time they had become refugees, having already been displaced in 1948. What Israelis experienced as a miraculous victory, Palestinians experienced as the extension of their dispossession from part of the land to nearly all of it.

Jerusalem

No prize of the war carried more emotional weight than Jerusalem. For nineteen years, since 1948, the city had been divided: Israeli West Jerusalem on one side, Jordanian East Jerusalem (including the walled Old City with its holy sites) on the other. Jews had been barred from the Western Wall, the last remnant of their ancient Temple and the holiest site at which they can pray.

When Israeli paratroopers fought their way into the Old City on June 7 and reached the Wall, the moment became the defining image of the war for the Jewish world: soldiers weeping at the stones after two thousand years. “The Temple Mount is in our hands,” the commander radioed. Israel moved almost immediately to annex East Jerusalem, declaring the city its eternal, undivided capital, a claim that virtually no other country has ever recognized, and that the UN considers a violation of international law.

But the hill the Western Wall supports is also home to the al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock: the compound Muslims call Haram al-Sharif (the Noble Sanctuary) and Jews call the Temple Mount, the third-holiest site in Islam and the holiest in Judaism, stacked on the same few acres. Israel’s defense minister, Moshe Dayan, made a fateful decision in the war’s aftermath: rather than assert Jewish control over the mosque compound, he left day-to-day administration in the hands of the Islamic religious authority, the Waqf, while Israel kept overall security control. This arrangement (Muslims administer and worship, Jews may visit but not pray, Israel holds security) became known as the “status quo,” and it has been one of the most sensitive tripwires in the entire conflict ever since. Disputes over the exact rules at this one holy site have repeatedly ignited wider violence.

The occupation begins

The word “occupation” is used so routinely in this conflict that it is worth pausing on what it actually meant. From June 1967 onward, more than a million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza lived under Israeli military rule: governed by army orders rather than by a parliament they could vote for, subject to military courts, military permits, and the authority of soldiers, with no citizenship in the state that controlled their lives and no state of their own. In 1967 many assumed this would be temporary, a card to be traded back for peace. It was not. The military occupation of the West Bank has now lasted more than half a century, longer than most of the people living under it have been alive. It is the single most important fact of daily Palestinian life, and the central grievance of the conflict’s modern phase.

And the human toll landed on people, not abstractions. Recall the hundreds of thousands displaced anew by this war, many of them, as noted, exiled for the second time in a single generation, made refugees in 1948 and then uprooted again in 1967 from wherever they had rebuilt. Behind the phrase “military occupation” were ordinary lives now lived at the mercy of permits and checkpoints: a farmer needing permission to reach his own field, a student stopped at a roadblock, a family whose fate turned on the decision of a soldier who did not speak their language. Here again the tragedy compounded rather than resolved. The very war that let Jews pray once more at the Western Wall, after nineteen years shut out and two thousand years of longing, was the same war that turned another wave of Palestinians into refugees and placed a million more under the rule of an army. In this conflict, Israeli gain and Palestinian loss have arrived, again and again, married to each other, and each loss has seeded the grievance that fuels the next round of violence. It is, in a terrible sense, a machine for producing sorrow on both sides, and 1967 set it running at a new and lasting intensity.

Two responses: Khartoum and Resolution 242

In the war’s aftermath, two opposing visions of what should happen next were put on the table (one from the Arab side, one from the international community) and the tension between them still structures every peace effort.

The Arab response came at a summit in the Sudanese capital in September 1967, remembered for the Khartoum “Three No’s”: no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with Israel. To a defeated and humiliated Arab world, any dealing with the victor felt like surrender. (Some historians note that Khartoum was actually a moderating compromise that shifted the Arab states toward seeking a political rather than purely military solution, but the slogan’s flat rejectionism is what echoed, and what hardened Israeli attitudes.)

The international response came in November 1967 in the form of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, which has been the diplomatic foundation of every serious peace negotiation since. Its core was a bargain that came to be called “land for peace”: Israel would withdraw from territories occupied in the war, and in return the Arab states would recognize Israel and its right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.

Resolution 242 also contained one of the most consequential ambiguities in diplomatic history. The English text called for Israeli withdrawal “from territories occupied in the recent conflict”, not “the territories” and not “all territories.” Israel has always read this to mean it need not withdraw from all the land, leaving room to keep some; the Arabs and Palestinians have always read it to require withdrawal from essentially all of it. Notably, Resolution 242 spoke of refugees but did not mention the Palestinians as a people with national rights at all: it treated the conflict as a matter between states. That omission reflected how invisible the Palestinians still were on the world stage in 1967, a situation they were about to change dramatically.

It is worth noting, too, that the crisis of 1967 and its resolution were once again shot through with great-power maneuvering. The spark that lit the fuse had come from Soviet disinformation: Moscow’s false warning to Egypt of an Israeli buildup, floated to bolster its Arab clients and pressure Israel, which helped stampede the region into a war none of its instigators fully controlled. During the war, the superpowers backed opposing sides: the Soviet Union armed and championed the Arab states, while the United States drew closer to Israel, a relationship that would deepen into the alliance that shapes the conflict today. And Resolution 242 itself was a great-power document, negotiated word by ambiguous word by the major powers on the Security Council to preserve their own room for maneuver. The Cold War now ran directly through the Holy Land: Israel increasingly the American client, the frontline Arab states increasingly Soviet ones, and the two peoples’ struggle overlaid with (and inflamed by) a global contest that had nothing to do with either of them.

The settlements begin

Perhaps no consequence of 1967 has done more to shape (and complicate) the present than the birth of the settlement movement: the establishment of Jewish civilian communities in the territories Israel had just occupied.

The impulse had several sources. For religious-nationalist Jews, the war’s capture of the biblical heartland was nothing less than a divine sign. The West Bank contains the sites of the ancient Israelite kingdoms: Hebron, Bethlehem, Shiloh, the hills the Bible calls Judea and Samaria. To settle this land was, in their eyes, to fulfill a religious destiny. The most influential expression of this fervor was the movement later known as Gush Emunim (“Bloc of the Faithful”), and figures like Rabbi Moshe Levinger, who in 1968 led a group to re-establish a Jewish presence in Hebron, birthplace of the settlement that became Kiryat Arba.

But it was not only the religious right. Israel’s governing Labor Party, secular and center-left, also began building settlements, for strategic reasons: the Allon Plan, named for minister Yigal Allon, proposed settling the sparsely populated Jordan Valley and other strategic zones to give Israel defensible borders. The first settlements went up within months of the war’s end. In this way, the settlement enterprise was, from the start, a joint project of both the Israeli left and right, a crucial point, because it means the settlements cannot be blamed on any single party or moment, and it explains why they have proven so hard to reverse.

The legal status of the settlements has been contested from the beginning. Most of the world (including the UN, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the International Court of Justice) holds that they violate the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits an occupying power from transferring its own civilian population into occupied territory. Israel disputes this, arguing that the territories are not technically “occupied” in the legal sense (since they were not the recognized sovereign territory of any state when captured) and that Jews have historical rights there. Whatever one concludes about the law, the practical effect is not in dispute: the settlements, which began as a handful of outposts, would grow over the following decades into a population of hundreds of thousands, physically fragmenting the West Bank and making the creation of a contiguous Palestinian state progressively harder. That slow-motion process, launched in the second half of 1967, is arguably the most important single development in the entire history that follows.

The Palestinians take their cause into their own hands

The Arab states’ catastrophic defeat in 1967 had one more far-reaching consequence: it destroyed Palestinian faith that Nasser or any Arab government would ever liberate Palestine for them. Into that vacuum stepped the independent Palestinian movement that had been building since the late 1950s.

The turning point was a battle in March 1968 at the Jordanian village of Karameh, where Israeli forces raiding a Fatah base ran into fierce resistance from Palestinian fighters (backed by the Jordanian army). Militarily the raid was inconclusive, but Fatah trumpeted it as a heroic Palestinian stand against the army that had just crushed three states, and the propaganda victory was electric. Recruits and money poured in. Within a year, Yasser Arafat and his Fatah movement had taken control of the previously toothless PLO, transforming it from a puppet of the Arab governments into a genuine, independent Palestinian national movement with Arafat as its chairman, a position he would hold until his death in 2004.

Not all of the movement was the same. Alongside Fatah, more radical factions emerged, most notably the Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), led by George Habash, which pioneered a strategy of spectacular international terrorism, hijacking civilian airliners in the late 1960s and early 1970s to force the world to pay attention to the Palestinian cause. These attacks put the Palestinians on the front pages, but they also fixed an association between the Palestinian cause and terrorism in Western minds that would take decades to complicate.

The PLO, rebuilt and militant, based itself in Jordan, from which it launched attacks on Israel, and where it grew into a heavily armed state-within-a-state that would soon collide catastrophically with its host. Meanwhile, Israel and Egypt fought a grinding, largely forgotten artillery and air conflict along the Suez Canal from 1969 to 1970, the War of Attrition, which ended in an inconclusive ceasefire. Nasser died, exhausted, in September 1970, and was succeeded by a vice president few took seriously: Anwar Sadat.

The stage was now set for the next explosion. The PLO’s presence in Jordan would end in bloodshed; a new Egyptian leader would launch a surprise war and then, astonishingly, make peace; and Israel would be drawn into a disastrous invasion of Lebanon. That decade of war and its first fragile peace is where Part 4 goes.

Disputed points in this era

  • Was the 1967 war preemptive or preventive? Israel presents it as a preemptive strike against imminent attack; some historians argue the Arab threat, while real in rhetoric, may not have been an imminent invasion, making it closer to a “war of choice.” Nasser’s true intentions remain debated (see Part 2).
  • The meaning of Resolution 242. The English/French wording ambiguity (“territories” vs. “the territories”) has never been resolved and is argued to this day; it underlies the entire “how much land” question.
  • What Khartoum meant. The popular reading is flat rejection (the “three no’s”); a scholarly minority argues it actually marked a shift toward eventual political engagement. Both readings appear in serious histories.
  • Settlement legality. Genuinely contested in international law. The strong international consensus holds them illegal under the Fourth Geneva Convention; Israel offers a minority legal argument that the Convention does not apply. This is a real legal dispute, not merely propaganda, though the international consensus is heavily one-sided.

Who’s who introduced in this part

King Hussein of Jordan: Ruler of Jordan who, against Israeli appeals, entered the 1967 war and lost the West Bank and East Jerusalem; a central figure in the decades to come.

Moshe Dayan: Israel’s defense minister in 1967; architect of the “status quo” arrangement at the Jerusalem holy sites.

George Habash: Founder of the Marxist PFLP, which pioneered airline hijackings as a tactic.

Rabbi Moshe Levinger: Leading figure of the religious settlement movement; re-established a Jewish presence in Hebron.

Yigal Allon: Israeli Labor minister whose Allon Plan guided early strategic settlement of the occupied territories.

Anwar Sadat: Nasser’s successor as president of Egypt from 1970; his choices would reshape the conflict in the next decade.

The occupation: Israeli military rule over the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza, beginning in 1967.

Resolution 242: The 1967 UN resolution establishing the “land for peace” framework; the basis of all later negotiations.

The Khartoum “Three No’s”: The 1967 Arab summit’s declaration of no peace, recognition, or negotiation with Israel.

Gush Emunim: The religious-nationalist movement that drove much of the settlement enterprise.

The settlements: Jewish civilian communities established in the occupied territories from 1967 onward; begun under both Labor and later right-wing governments.

Haram al-Sharif / Temple Mount: The Jerusalem holy compound sacred to both Muslims and Jews; governed by the “status quo.”

PFLP: The radical Marxist faction of the Palestinian movement, known for international terrorism.

al-Naksa: “The setback”; the Arab term for the 1967 defeat.

Next: Part 4: War and the First Peace (1970–1982). The expulsion of the PLO from Jordan in “Black September,” the shock of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Sadat’s astonishing journey to Jerusalem and the Camp David peace with Egypt, and Israel’s fateful invasion of Lebanon, ending in the massacre at Sabra and Shatila and the rise of Hezbollah.

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