The fifth installment of the series. This part covers a decade of extremes: the bloody expulsion of the PLO from Jordan, the shocking surprise war of 1973, the astonishing peace between Israel and Egypt, and the disastrous invasion of Lebanon that ended in massacre and gave birth to a new enemy. It is the decade in which the conflict produced both its first real peace and some of its darkest hours.

Where we left off

The crushing Arab defeat of 1967 discredited the Arab states and opened space for the Palestinians to take their cause into their own hands. Yasser Arafat’s Fatah seized control of the PLO and turned it into a genuine, independent national movement, while radical factions like George Habash’s PFLP pioneered a strategy of spectacular international terrorism. Rebuilt and heavily armed, the PLO based itself in Jordan, where it had grown into a state-within-a-state that was about to collide catastrophically with its host. Meanwhile Egypt’s Nasser died in 1970, succeeded by a vice-president few took seriously: Anwar Sadat.

Black September

By 1970, the PLO in Jordan had become a power unto itself: armed fighters manning checkpoints, defying Jordanian law, and openly talking of toppling the monarchy. For King Hussein, whose kingdom’s population was already more than half Palestinian, this was an intolerable challenge to his throne.

The breaking point came in September 1970, when the PFLP hijacked several Western airliners and flew three of them to a desert airstrip in Jordan, where, after releasing the passengers, they blew the empty planes up in front of the world’s television cameras. It was a deliberate humiliation of Hussein on his own soil. The king had had enough. He unleashed his army on the Palestinian militias in a short, ferocious war that killed thousands of Palestinians and drove the PLO out of Jordan for good. The fighters and their leadership relocated to Lebanon.

Palestinians remember this bloody episode as Black September, and a new Fatah-linked terrorist cell took that name for itself, with murderous consequences the world would see two years later.

Munich

At the 1972 Summer Olympics in Munich, the Black September group carried out the act that fixed the association between the Palestinian cause and terrorism in the global imagination for a generation. Gunmen broke into the Olympic village, took members of the Israeli team hostage, and in the botched rescue attempt that followed, eleven Israeli athletes and coaches were killed, along with a German policeman. The massacre unfolded on live television before a worldwide audience gathered for the Games.

Israel’s response was Operation Wrath of God, a years-long campaign by its intelligence service, the Mossad, to hunt down and kill those it held responsible, in a series of assassinations across Europe and the Middle East. Munich and its aftermath established a grim dynamic of terrorism and targeted killing that would echo for decades, and made clear that the Palestinian conflict was now a global one.

The Yom Kippur War: shock and its uses

The next explosion came from the states, not the militias, and it caught Israel completely off guard.

After 1967, Israel had settled into a dangerous complacency, confident that its crushing military superiority would deter any Arab attack and that the Arabs would never dare start a war they were sure to lose. This assumption (Israeli analysts later called it simply “the Conception”) blinded the country to the mounting evidence that Egypt’s new president, Anwar Sadat, was preparing for exactly that.

Sadat had a subtle goal. He did not expect to destroy Israel. He wanted to shatter the frozen, humiliating status quo in which Egypt had lost the Sinai and had no way to get it back: to shock Israel and the superpowers into a diplomatic process, and to restore Egyptian and Arab honor after the disgrace of 1967. A limited, successful war, he reasoned, could achieve what a decade of stalemate had not.

On October 6, 1973, Yom Kippur, the holiest and most solemn day of the Jewish calendar, when much of Israel was fasting and at rest (and during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, giving the war its other name, the Ramadan War), Egypt and Syria launched a coordinated surprise attack. Egyptian forces stormed across the Suez Canal, overran Israel’s supposedly impregnable defensive line, and established themselves in the Sinai. Syrian forces simultaneously assaulted the Golan Heights in the north. In the first days, Israel reeled: caught unprepared, it suffered heavy casualties and, for the first time since 1948, faced the genuine fear of military catastrophe. Prime Minister Golda Meir and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, the hero of 1967, presided over days of near-panic.

Then the tide turned. The United States launched a massive airlift of weapons to resupply Israel (as the Soviet Union resupplied the Arabs, making the war a superpower proxy confrontation). Israel regrouped, halted the Syrians and pushed toward Damascus, and in a daring operation led by the ever-controversial general Ariel Sharon, counterattacked across the Suez Canal, encircling an entire Egyptian army. When a ceasefire took hold on October 22 under UN Security Council Resolution 338 (which reaffirmed Resolution 242 and, crucially, called for actual negotiations between the parties), Israel had once again turned early disaster into military victory. But it had lost some 2,600 soldiers and, more importantly, its aura of invincibility.

The 1973 war was also, as much as any episode in this history, a superpower confrontation fought through local hands. Both great powers poured weapons into their clients in real time: as the Soviet Union resupplied Egypt and Syria, the United States launched a massive emergency airlift to rearm Israel, a decisive intervention without which the war might have gone differently. For a few tense days, as Israel encircled Egypt’s army and the superpowers backed opposing sides, the crisis raised the specter of a direct US–Soviet clash, and both moved their forces to heightened alert. The two peoples’ war had become a flashpoint in a global rivalry, and their fate briefly rode on decisions taken in Washington and Moscow. It was this same dynamic (the superpowers’ stake in not letting the region explode) that helped drive them to impose a ceasefire.

The war had two further enormous consequences beyond the battlefield. First, the Arab oil-producing states imposed an oil embargo on the United States and other supporters of Israel, quadrupling world oil prices and triggering a global economic crisis. This was a watershed: it revealed oil as a weapon and announced that the wealth and leverage of the Gulf petro-states would now be a permanent factor in the conflict: the interests of distant capitals and energy markets bound up ever more tightly with the fate of the land. Second, and more lasting, the war’s psychological effect cut both ways in a manner that made peace possible. It so traumatized Israel, shattering “the Conception” and toppling Golda Meir’s government amid recriminations over the intelligence failure, that Israelis became more willing to trade land for security. And it so restored Arab, and especially Egyptian, pride (Sadat could now claim, with some truth, to have “won” by breaking the taboo of Israeli invincibility) that Sadat gained the domestic standing he needed to do the unthinkable: make peace.

The astonishing peace

The road from the 1973 war to peace ran first through patient diplomacy (US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s “shuttle diplomacy” produced a series of interim disengagement agreements) and then through an upheaval in Israeli politics. In 1977, for the first time in the country’s history, the left-wing Labor movement that had founded and governed Israel since 1948 lost power. The winner was Menachem Begin, the former Irgun militia commander of 1948, now leader of the right-wing Likud party, a hawk, a champion of the settlements, and, on the surface, the least likely peacemaker imaginable.

And yet it was Begin who made the peace. In November 1977, Sadat did something no Arab leader had ever done: he flew to Jerusalem and addressed the Israeli Knesset, standing before the parliament of the enemy state and speaking of peace. The gesture stunned the world and electrified both nations. It was an act of extraordinary political courage, and it would ultimately cost Sadat his life.

The following year, US President Jimmy Carter brought Sadat and Begin to the presidential retreat at Camp David in Maryland and, over thirteen grueling days in September 1978, hammered out the Camp David Accords. These produced, in March 1979, the Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty, the first peace treaty between Israel and any Arab state. Its terms were historic: Israel returned the entire Sinai Peninsula to Egypt (a withdrawal completed in 1982, requiring Israel to dismantle its own settlements there), and in exchange Egypt formally recognized Israel and established normal relations. The “land for peace” formula of Resolution 242 had, for the first time, actually worked.

Here the interests of the powerful, for once, pushed toward peace rather than war, but they were interests all the same. The peace was made possible by, and served, the United States, which emerged as the indispensable broker and paymaster of Middle East diplomacy. Sadat had already expelled his Soviet advisors and swung Egypt from Moscow’s camp toward Washington’s; Camp David sealed that realignment, delivering the Arab world’s most populous state into the American orbit, sidelining Soviet influence, and stabilizing the region around US power. The deal was underwritten with enormous, and enduring, American aid to both Egypt and Israel: the two have been among the largest recipients of US assistance ever since. Peace between two peoples and a strategic win for a superpower turned out, in this instance, to be the same transaction. That the powerful can serve peace when it suits them is one of the more hopeful lessons buried in this history, and a reminder of how much depends on whether their interests happen to align with it.

But Camp David had a second, failed half that matters enormously for this series. Alongside the Egypt treaty, the accords included a vague framework for Palestinian “autonomy” in the West Bank and Gaza, a gesture toward Palestinian self-rule. It went nowhere. The Palestinians and the PLO, not consulted and offered only limited autonomy rather than statehood, rejected it; Begin, who intended to keep the West Bank permanently and accelerated settlement there, had no interest in making it real. So the peace that emerged was a separate peace: Egypt, the largest and most powerful Arab state, made its own deal and left the Palestinians behind. This removed the possibility of a united Arab war against Israel, a genuine strategic earthquake, but it also left the core of the conflict, the Palestinian question, entirely unresolved.

The price of the peace was steep for Sadat. The Arab world was enraged at what it saw as betrayal; Egypt was expelled from the Arab League and isolated for a decade. And in October 1981, Sadat was assassinated at a military parade by soldiers belonging to an Egyptian Islamist extremist group who regarded his peace with Israel as treason against Islam. The pattern first seen in the murder of Count Bernadotte in 1948 repeated: a peacemaker cut down by extremists on his own side who found compromise intolerable. The peace treaty, remarkably, survived his death and holds to this day: a cold peace, but an unbroken one.

Begin, meanwhile, pressed a hard-line agenda elsewhere. In 1981 his government bombed and destroyed Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor to prevent Saddam Hussein from acquiring a bomb, and annexed the Golan Heights captured from Syria in 1967, a move, like the annexation of East Jerusalem, that virtually no country recognized. But his most fateful decision lay to the north, in Lebanon.

The Lebanese catastrophe

After its expulsion from Jordan in 1970, the PLO had rebuilt its state-within-a-state in Lebanon, especially in the south (a region Israelis dubbed “Fatahland”) from which it launched rocket attacks and cross-border raids into northern Israel. Lebanon itself was by now disintegrating into a horrifically complex civil war (begun in 1975) among its Christian, Sunni, Shia, and Druze communities, with the armed Palestinian presence one destabilizing factor among many. Israel had already staged one limited invasion of southern Lebanon in 1978.

In June 1982, Israel launched a far larger invasion, Operation Peace for Galilee, with the stated aim of pushing the PLO’s rockets out of range of northern Israel. But its true architect, Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, had a far more ambitious and reckless plan: to drive all the way to Beirut, destroy the PLO entirely, and install a friendly Christian government in Lebanon that would make peace with Israel. Israeli forces smashed north, linked up with their Christian Phalangist militia allies, and laid siege to Beirut, subjecting the city to weeks of punishing bombardment. Under the siege, the PLO leadership finally agreed to evacuate. In late summer 1982, Arafat and thousands of his fighters sailed out of Beirut into a new and distant exile in Tunisia, far from Palestine, their military option seemingly broken.

And then came the atrocity that defined the war. In September 1982, Israel’s chosen Lebanese ally, president-elect Bashir Gemayel, was assassinated. In the chaos and fury that followed, Israeli forces controlling West Beirut allowed Phalangist militiamen, bent on revenge, to enter the Sabra and Shatila Palestinian refugee camps. Over some thirty-six hours, the militiamen massacred hundreds, by some estimates up to around 2,000, unarmed Palestinian civilians (men, women, and children) while Israeli troops held the perimeter and, at minimum, did nothing to stop it.

The massacre horrified the world and shook Israel to its core. In an act of democratic self-scrutiny that has few parallels in the region, Israel’s own government appointed an official inquiry, the Kahan Commission, which in 1983 found Israel indirectly responsible for the slaughter and held Defense Minister Ariel Sharon personally responsible for ignoring the obvious risk of allowing the Phalangists into the camps. It recommended his removal, and he was forced to resign as defense minister, though, in a fact heavy with foreshadowing, his political career did not end there. Two decades later, Ariel Sharon would become prime minister of Israel.

The Lebanon war was a strategic disaster. It did drive the PLO out of Lebanon, but at a catastrophic cost to Israel’s international standing and its own soul, and it dragged Israel into an 18-year occupation of a “security zone” in southern Lebanon that would bleed it slowly until 2000. Worst of all, it created a new and far more formidable enemy. Out of the Shia community of southern Lebanon, mobilized against the Israeli occupation and backed by the revolutionary Islamic Republic of Iran, a new militant movement was born in the early 1980s: Hezbollah (“the Party of God”). Where the largely secular PLO had been Israel’s northern adversary, it would now face a disciplined, Iranian-armed Islamist force that would fight it for decades to come, and that introduced Iran, for the first time, as a direct player on Israel’s borders.

Where the decade left things

By the end of 1982, the board had been dramatically rearranged:

  • Israel had achieved its first peace with an Arab state, Egypt, neutralizing its most powerful military opponent, a genuine and durable achievement.
  • But the Palestinian question at the heart of the conflict remained utterly unresolved, and the PLO had been scattered into distant exile in Tunisia, cut off from the territories and the people it claimed to represent.
  • The occupation of the West Bank and Gaza ground on, now a decade and a half old, with settlements steadily expanding under a right-wing government committed to keeping the land.
  • And two new forces had entered the story: Iran, newly turned revolutionary and Islamist after its 1979 revolution, and its Lebanese creation Hezbollah: the shape of conflicts still being fought today.

And beneath the rearranged chessboard lay, as always, the human ledger, and in this decade it was written in blood on every side. Israeli families buried the athletes murdered at Munich and the thousands of soldiers killed in the Yom Kippur War. Palestinian families buried the thousands killed when Jordan expelled the PLO in Black September, and then the hundreds of unarmed civilians (old men, women, children) slaughtered in the alleys of Sabra and Shatila while the world watched. Lebanese of every community were ground up in a civil war made worse by the fighting on their soil. Egyptians lost their president to an assassin’s bullet for the sin of making peace. The one bright thread, that Israel and Egypt found a way to stop killing each other, and have kept that peace for over forty years, stands as proof that the cycle can be broken. But the Palestinians, the people at the very center of the conflict, ended the decade further from a home of their own than when it began: dispossessed, occupied, and now abandoned even by the Arab states that claimed their cause. That unhealed wound was about to make itself heard, not through exiled leaders or foreign armies, but through the voices of ordinary people under occupation who had run out of patience. Their explosion of frustration (the First Intifada) and the new Islamist movement it would spawn, Hamas, is where Part 5 goes.

Disputed points in this era

  • Sadat’s aims in 1973. Most historians agree Sadat sought a limited war to unfreeze diplomacy rather than to destroy Israel, but the balance of his military versus political goals is still analyzed and debated.
  • The scale of Israeli intelligence failure in 1973. How much warning Israel had and ignored (and who was to blame) was the subject of the Agranat Commission and remains argued; some evidence of Egyptian and Syrian intentions was available and dismissed under “the Conception.”
  • Sabra and Shatila’s death toll and Israeli culpability. Estimates of the dead range widely (from a few hundred to around 2,000+). The Kahan Commission found indirect Israeli responsibility; critics argue Israeli forces bore more direct responsibility than the commission acknowledged. The finding of Sharon’s personal responsibility is on the record.
  • Whether the 1982 war was a “war of choice.” Widely regarded, including within Israel, as an elective war driven by Sharon’s ambitions rather than strict defensive necessity, but the degree of the PLO threat from Lebanon is still weighed differently by different historians.

Who’s who introduced in this part

Anwar Sadat: President of Egypt; launched the 1973 war, then made a historic peace with Israel; assassinated by Islamist extremists in 1981.

Golda Meir: Israeli prime minister during the 1973 Yom Kippur War; resigned in 1974 amid recriminations over the intelligence failure.

Menachem Begin: Former Irgun commander turned leader of the right-wing Likud; became prime minister in 1977 and, improbably, made peace with Egypt while accelerating West Bank settlement.

Jimmy Carter: US president who brokered the Camp David Accords between Begin and Sadat.

Ariel Sharon: Architect of the 1982 Lebanon invasion; found personally responsible for failing to prevent the Sabra and Shatila massacre and forced to resign as defense minister; a future prime minister.

Bashir Gemayel: Israel’s Christian Phalangist ally, elected president of Lebanon and assassinated in 1982, triggering the Sabra and Shatila massacre.

Black September: Both the 1970 Jordanian crackdown that expelled the PLO, and the Fatah-linked terrorist group (named for it) that carried out the 1972 Munich massacre.

Yom Kippur War (1973): The surprise Egyptian-Syrian attack that shattered Israeli complacency and paved the way for peace with Egypt.

Resolution 338 (1973): The UN resolution ending the 1973 war; reaffirmed 242 and called for direct negotiations.

Camp David Accords (1978) / Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty (1979): The first peace between Israel and an Arab state; returned the Sinai to Egypt.

Likud: Israel’s main right-wing party, which took power under Begin in 1977.

Hezbollah: The Iranian-backed Lebanese Shia militia born out of resistance to Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon; a major adversary to this day.

Iran: After its 1979 Islamic Revolution, an emerging patron of anti-Israel militancy, beginning with Hezbollah.

Next: Part 5: Uprising (1987–1993). The eruption of the First Intifada and how a spontaneous Palestinian revolt changed the way Israelis and the world saw the occupation; the birth of Hamas and its uncompromising charter; and the PLO’s fateful turn from armed struggle toward recognition and compromise, setting the table for the Oslo peace process.

Leave a Comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Save to list