The sixth installment of the series. This part covers the moment the Palestinians under occupation stopped waiting for anyone to save them: the First Intifada. It is the story of how a spontaneous revolt of ordinary people changed the way Israelis and the world saw the occupation, how it pushed the PLO toward historic compromise, and how it also gave birth to Hamas, the movement that would ultimately reject that compromise and reshape the conflict for the next forty years.

Where we left off

By 1982 the board had been rearranged. Israel had made peace with Egypt, a genuine achievement, but the Palestinian question was left out of the deal. Israel’s invasion of Lebanon had driven the PLO into distant exile in Tunisia, ending in the horror of Sabra and Shatila and giving birth to a new enemy, the Iranian-backed Hezbollah. And the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza ground on, now fifteen years old, with settlements steadily expanding. The Palestinians’ own leadership was scattered a thousand miles away, and the Arab states had either made peace or moved on. Nobody was coming to save them. That fact, more than anything, is what produced what happened next.

Twenty years of small humiliations

To understand the explosion of December 1987, you have to understand what two decades of military occupation actually felt like to the people living inside it, not as a geopolitical abstraction, but as a daily texture of life.

By the mid-1980s, a Palestinian in the West Bank or Gaza had lived their entire adult life under the rule of a foreign army. They had no vote in the state that governed them and no state of their own. They were tried in military courts, not civilian ones. They needed permits: to build a room onto their house, to dig a well, to plant certain crops, to travel, sometimes to work. They passed through checkpoints manned by young soldiers, where a wait could last minutes or hours depending on someone else’s mood. Their land could be confiscated as “state land” and their water allocated on terms they had no say in, while the settlements (now home to tens of thousands of Israelis) expanded on the hills above them, connected by roads they often could not use, consuming a disproportionate share of the water beneath their feet.

Many worked in Israel itself, rising before dawn to cross the line and labor in construction and agriculture for wages that made them the economy’s cheapest hands, then returning at night to towns without adequate sewage or infrastructure. They watched the country that governed them prosper while they were locked out of it. And the young (the generation born after 1967, who had never known anything else) grew up with no memory of dignity to draw on and no expectation of a future.

None of this, on its own, is the stuff of headlines. There is no single atrocity here, no massacre to name. That is precisely the point. It was the accumulated weight of ordinary, grinding indignity, the sense of being permanently subject to the will of others in one’s own home, that built the pressure. And it had nowhere to go: the PLO was in Tunis, the Arab states had lost interest, and at an Arab summit in Amman in November 1987 (the last straw for many), the Palestinian cause was pushed far down the agenda, eclipsed by the Iran–Iraq War. The message received in the camps of Gaza was blunt: you are on your own.

The Intifada erupts

On December 8, 1987, an Israeli army truck collided with a line of cars carrying Palestinian workers at a checkpoint in Gaza, killing four of them. Rumors spread instantly that it had been deliberate revenge for an Israeli stabbed days earlier. At the funerals that night in the Jabalia refugee camp, grief turned to rage, and the rage did not subside. It spread from Jabalia through Gaza and into the West Bank within days, and it did not stop for six years.

This was the First Intifada, from the Arabic for “shaking off.” What made it extraordinary was that nobody ordered it. It was not launched by Arafat in Tunis, who was as surprised as anyone; it erupted from below, from the camps and towns and villages, and it was organized largely by local committees of ordinary people: shopkeepers, students, teachers, women’s groups, trade unionists. A clandestine coordinating body, the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising, issued leaflets calling for strikes and protests.

And its methods, at least at first, were mostly not those of guerrilla warfare. This was mass civil resistance: general strikes, commercial shutdowns, refusal to pay taxes, boycotts of Israeli goods, resignations of Palestinian police from the civil administration, and, above all, demonstrations in which crowds of young people, many of them teenagers and children, confronted one of the world’s most powerful armies with stones.

That image, a boy with a rock facing a tank, went around the world, and it changed everything.

“Break their bones”

Israel was caught utterly off guard, and its response, improvised and heavy-handed, proved a catastrophe for its own image.

The army was trained to fight armies, not to police a civilian uprising. Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, the same Rabin who as a young officer had helped expel the Palestinians of Lydda in 1948, adopted a policy of “might, power, and beatings,” and was widely reported to have instructed troops to break the bones of stone-throwers rather than shoot them, as a supposedly less lethal deterrent. The result was footage, broadcast worldwide, of Israeli soldiers clubbing Palestinian youths. There were mass arrests and administrative detentions without trial, deportations, curfews that confined whole towns for weeks, school closures that shut down Palestinian education for extended periods, and the demolition of the homes of suspects’ families.

Over roughly six years, the toll was heavily one-sided. Israeli forces killed more than 1,000 Palestinians, a significant number of them children and teenagers. Palestinians killed around 160 Israelis. And in one of the uprising’s darkest internal chapters, Palestinians killed hundreds of their own (perhaps 800 or more) as suspected “collaborators” with Israel, a wave of vigilante killings that settled personal scores as often as it caught genuine informers, and that left deep scars in Palestinian society.

Here the human tragedy has to be stated in both directions, because both are real. Palestinian parents buried children shot dead in the street for throwing stones; a generation of Palestinian boys grew up in and out of detention. And Israelis (including conscripted eighteen-year-olds, ordinary kids doing their national service) were sent to break up crowds of other people’s children, and came home changed by it, some morally corroded, some deeply troubled by what they had been asked to do. Israeli civilians were stabbed and firebombed and learned to fear the streets of Jerusalem. There was no clean side in this, only a great many ruined lives, which is what occupation and resistance to occupation produce, everywhere, always.

What the Intifada changed

The uprising achieved almost nothing on the ground. Israel did not withdraw. The settlements kept growing. And yet it may have been the single most politically consequential thing the Palestinians ever did, because it changed how the conflict was seen.

For twenty years, the world’s dominant image of the Palestinian cause had been the one the PLO’s own radicals had supplied: hijacked airliners, the Munich massacre, terrorism. Now, on nightly television, the image was inverted: teenagers with stones against tanks, and soldiers beating boys. The moral asymmetry was impossible to unsee, and it transformed international opinion, in Europe, in the United States, and among liberal Jews abroad.

It also transformed opinion inside Israel. A significant portion of the Israeli public, watching what their army was being asked to do to civilians, concluded that the occupation was corroding their own society and could not go on. The Israeli peace camp swelled; a movement of reserve soldiers refusing to serve in the territories gained visibility. It was in these years that the political ground shifted enough to make a leader like Rabin, the man who had ordered the beatings, begin to conclude that force alone could not solve this, and that a political settlement was necessary. There is a hard irony there worth sitting with: it took the Intifada to convince a critical mass of Israelis that the status quo was intolerable, and it was the general who suppressed it who would end up shaking Arafat’s hand.

The PLO’s historic compromise

For Yasser Arafat in Tunis, the Intifada was both an opportunity and a threat. It had happened without him, and it demonstrated that the initiative had passed to the Palestinians inside the territories, who might well produce a rival leadership. He had to catch up with his own people, and quickly.

In November 1988, meeting in Algiers, the Palestine National Council took a step of enormous historic weight. It issued a Declaration of Independence, proclaiming a State of Palestine, and, crucially, it accepted UN Resolutions 242 and 181. The meaning of that was unmistakable: by accepting 242 and the old partition principle, the PLO was implicitly accepting a Palestinian state alongside Israel in only the West Bank and Gaza (that is, on roughly 22% of historic Palestine) rather than in place of it. Weeks later, under American pressure and in careful, negotiated wording, Arafat publicly recognized Israel’s right to exist and renounced terrorism.

This was the Palestinian national movement’s historic compromise, and it is essential to grasp what it cost. Arafat was asking his people (most of them refugees from the other 78%) to formally give up their claim to the towns and villages they had lost in 1948, in exchange for a state on the fragments. Many Palestinians regarded it as a betrayal of everything they had suffered for. He made the concession anyway, and it opened the door to negotiations with the United States and, eventually, with Israel.

Then he made a catastrophic mistake. In 1990, when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, Arafat sided with him, a decision that played to Palestinian anger but enraged the Gulf states that funded the PLO and the Western powers whose recognition it needed. The consequences were brutal: the Gulf monarchies cut off the PLO’s money, leaving it nearly bankrupt, and hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were expelled from Kuwait in retaliation, a mass displacement that shattered a prosperous diaspora community and is little remembered outside Palestinian circles. Arafat had gambled and lost, and by 1991 he was broke, isolated, and desperate, a weakness that would shape the deal he later signed.

The birth of Hamas

The Intifada’s other great consequence was the emergence of the movement that would come to define the conflict’s next four decades.

In December 1987, in the first days of the uprising, activists of the Gaza branch of the Muslim Brotherhood (an Islamist movement that had until then focused on religious preaching, charity, and social services rather than armed struggle) founded Hamas (an Arabic acronym for the Islamic Resistance Movement, and also a word meaning “zeal”). Its guiding figure was a frail, wheelchair-bound cleric named Sheikh Ahmed Yassin.

Hamas offered a rival answer to Fatah’s. Where the PLO was secular, nationalist, and now moving toward compromise with Israel, Hamas was Islamist and uncompromising. Its 1988 charter was an uncompromising and, in significant passages, openly antisemitic document: it called Palestine an Islamic endowment that no one had the right to surrender, rejected negotiated settlement in principle, called for Israel’s destruction, and recycled classic antisemitic conspiracy libels, including reference to the forged Protocols of the Elders of Zion. (Hamas would issue a revised political document in 2017 that dropped the explicit antisemitism and accepted a state on the 1967 lines as an interim step, while still refusing to recognize Israel. The original charter was never formally rescinded.)

Hamas grew for reasons that had little to do with theology alone. It built genuine popular support through a dense network of social services (clinics, schools, food aid, orphanages) in a society the occupation had impoverished and the PLO’s distant, corrupt bureaucracy had failed. It offered dignity and defiance to people exhausted by both. And every failure of the peace process, every year the promised state did not arrive, would drive more Palestinians into its arms.

There is one more uncomfortable fact in the record, and it deserves stating plainly and without exaggeration. In the movement’s early, pre-Hamas years, Israel permitted and in some respects facilitated the growth of Yassin’s Islamist charitable network in Gaza, calculating that a religious movement focused on preaching and welfare would be a useful counterweight to the secular, nationalist PLO, the enemy Israel then took seriously. Israeli officials have since acknowledged this as a grave miscalculation. It is important to be precise: this was not the “creation” of Hamas by Israel, as the more conspiratorial tellings would have it; Hamas grew from deep indigenous roots in Palestinian Islamism and Palestinian despair. But it is a documented example of a familiar pattern in this history: a powerful actor cynically playing one faction against another for short-term advantage, and reaping a catastrophe it never imagined. The same lesson was learned, at similar cost, by the great powers who armed and financed militants elsewhere in the region during these years.

The powerful reshuffle the deck

The turn of the 1990s transformed the world around the conflict, and the transformation was, once again, driven by forces far outside it.

The Soviet Union collapsed. At a stroke, the Arab states lost their superpower patron, their arms supplier, and their diplomatic protector. The PLO lost a major backer. And the United States emerged as the world’s sole superpower and the unchallenged arbiter of the Middle East, a position it consolidated by assembling a vast international coalition to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait in the 1991 Gulf War. The Cold War overlay that had structured the region for forty years simply evaporated.

The consequences for the Palestinians were direct and severe. Their leadership was bankrupt (having backed Saddam), their Soviet patron was gone, their Gulf funding was cut off, and the only power that mattered was the United States, Israel’s closest ally. They were negotiating, in other words, from the weakest position they had occupied in decades.

Washington, flush with post-Gulf War authority, convened the Madrid Conference in October 1991, the first time Israelis and Arabs, including a Palestinian delegation (from the territories, since Israel still refused to deal with the PLO), sat down together for public negotiations. Madrid produced no breakthrough, and the formal talks that followed in Washington ground into stalemate. But it broke a taboo. And in the years just after, mass immigration from the collapsing Soviet Union (around a million Jews, transforming Israeli society) and a growing Israeli sense that the Intifada had made the status quo unbearable, combined to bring a new government to power in Israel in 1992, led by Yitzhak Rabin, elected on a promise to pursue peace.

The stage was set. In secret, far from Madrid and Washington, in a country house outside Oslo, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators were about to begin talking directly to each other for the first time, with a bankrupt, weakened Arafat desperate for a deal, and a battle-hardened Rabin who had concluded that force alone would never work.

What they produced would raise the hopes of both peoples higher than they had ever been, and then break them. That is where Part 6 goes.

Disputed points in this era

  • Rabin’s “break their bones” order. Widely reported and attributed to Rabin, and consistent with the documented policy of “might, power, and beatings”; whether he used those exact words has been disputed by some of his defenders. The policy’s effects are not in dispute.
  • Israel’s early tolerance of the Islamist movement in Gaza. That Israel permitted and in some ways facilitated Yassin’s network as a counterweight to the PLO is acknowledged in the record, including by former Israeli officials. Claims that Israel “created” or controlled Hamas go well beyond the evidence and are rejected by serious historians.
  • Casualty figures for the First Intifada. Estimates vary by source (B’Tselem, Israeli government, Palestinian sources) but cluster around 1,000+ Palestinians and roughly 160 Israelis killed, with several hundred Palestinians killed by other Palestinians as alleged collaborators.
  • How spontaneous the Intifada was. Broadly agreed to have erupted from below rather than being directed by the PLO, though the degree to which existing local activist networks shaped it from early on is debated.

Who’s who introduced in this part

Sheikh Ahmed Yassin: Wheelchair-bound Gaza cleric; founder and spiritual leader of Hamas.

Hamas: The Islamic Resistance Movement, founded 1987 out of the Muslim Brotherhood; rejects recognition of Israel; combines armed struggle with an extensive social-services network.

The First Intifada (1987–1993): The mass Palestinian uprising against the occupation; largely a movement of civil resistance and stone-throwing youths, met with beatings, mass arrests, and lethal force.

Unified National Leadership of the Uprising: The clandestine coordinating body of local committees that organized the Intifada from within the territories.

The Palestinian Declaration of Independence (1988): The PLO’s acceptance of Resolutions 242 and 181, implicitly accepting a state alongside Israel on 22% of historic Palestine; the movement’s historic compromise.

Yitzhak Rabin: Israeli defense minister who suppressed the Intifada with the “might, power, and beatings” policy, then became prime minister in 1992 on a platform of pursuing peace.

Madrid Conference (1991): The first public Israeli–Arab peace conference, convened by a post–Cold War United States.

The Gulf War (1991): Arafat’s disastrous decision to back Saddam Hussein, which bankrupted the PLO and led to the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from Kuwait.

Next: Part 6: The Peace That Wasn’t (1993–2000). The secret channel in Oslo, the handshake on the White House lawn, the birth of the Palestinian Authority, and then the unraveling: suicide bombings, relentless settlement growth, the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin by a Jewish extremist, and the collapse of the Camp David summit. The story of the closest this conflict has ever come to peace, and of how it died.

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